Anti-Vaxxers, Conspiracy Theories, & Epistemic Responsibility: Crash Course Philosophy #14

 

Epistemic Responsibility: Why What We Believe Matters

For generations, vaccinations were a routine part of life in the United States. Thanks to widespread vaccination efforts, diseases like measles were nearly eradicated. However, a 1998 study linked vaccines with autism, sparking controversy. Although this study was later discredited, its impact has been lasting. A vocal subset of parents continues to refuse vaccinations, resulting in the resurgence of preventable diseases like measles, whooping cough, and mumps. The consequences of these unfounded beliefs are real and dangerous, particularly for children.

So, why does this matter? In philosophy, we often discuss responsibility in terms of actions, but there's another type of responsibility that's equally important: epistemic responsibility. This concept refers to the responsibility we have concerning our beliefs. It's a fascinating area of philosophy where epistemology intersects with ethics and even the philosophy of religion.

Philosopher W.K. Clifford was a strong advocate for epistemic responsibility. He famously stated, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” Clifford illustrated his point with a story about a shipowner who knew his ship was old and likely unsafe, but convinced himself it was seaworthy. The ship eventually sank, killing all aboard. According to Clifford, the shipowner was morally guilty not just because of the tragedy that occurred, but because he allowed himself to believe something without sufficient evidence. Clifford's argument emphasizes that our beliefs are never truly private; they influence our actions and can spread to others, often with harmful consequences.

But what about beliefs that don't have clear evidence, like religious faith? This is where the debate gets interesting. William James, a 19th-century philosopher and psychologist, challenged Clifford's view. James believed that certain beliefs could be morally permissible even without evidence. He argued that when choosing to believe something, the nature of the belief plays a crucial role in its moral defensibility. Specifically, James proposed that a belief is justified if it meets three criteria: it must be a live option (something you can genuinely consider), a forced option (a choice you can't avoid), and a momentous option (one that could significantly impact your life).

For James, religious belief fits these criteria. He viewed it as a live option for many people, a forced option because he didn't consider agnosticism a genuine stance, and a momentous option due to its potential to profoundly affect one's life. Thus, James concluded that it's justifiable to believe in God based on faith alone, even without evidence.

However, this raises a challenging question: If we're justified in believing in God without evidence, could the same logic apply to other beliefs, like the decision not to vaccinate? This slippery slope reveals the complexity of epistemic responsibility. While philosophy may not eliminate unfounded beliefs, it equips us with the tools to critically evaluate and argue against them.

In today's world, filled with conspiracy theories, climate change denial, and other baseless beliefs, understanding epistemic responsibility is more crucial than ever. Our beliefs matter, not just to us but to the broader society. They shape our actions and influence those around us, often in subtle but significant ways. As Clifford and James illustrate, the responsibility we have towards our beliefs is not just a philosophical curiosity—it's a moral imperative.